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Documents dont l'auteur est "Lafrance, Stéphane"

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Nombre de documents: 12

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Ben Ftima, M., Lafrance, S., & Léger, P. (2020). Three-dimensional modelling of shear keys in concrete gravity dams using an advanced grillage method. Water Science and Engineering, 13(3), 223-232. Disponible

Ben Hadj-Alouane, N., Lafrance, S., Lin, F., Mullins, J., & Yeddes, M. (2005). On the Verification of Intransitive Noninterference in Mulitlevel Security. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Part B, Cybernetics, 35(5), 948-958. Lien externe

Ben Hadj-Alouane, N., Lafrance, S., Lin, F., Mullins, J., & Yeddes, M. (septembre 2004). Discrete event systems approach to the verification of the information flow properties in secure protocols [Communication écrite]. 7th Workshop on Discrete Event System (WODES 2004), Reims, France. Publié dans IFAC Proceedings, 37(18). Lien externe

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Hadj-Alouane Nejib, B. E. N., Lafrance, S., Feng, L. I. N., Mullins, J., & Yeddes, M. (2005). Characterizing intransitive noninterference for 3-domain security policies with observability. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 50(6), 920-925. Lien externe

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Lafrance, S. (2006). Using Equivalence-Checking to Verify Robustness to Denial of Service. Computer Networks, 50(9), 1327-1348. Lien externe

Lafrance, S. (2005). Spécification et validation de protocoles de sécurité [Thèse de doctorat, École Polytechnique de Montréal]. Disponible

Lafrance, S. (2004). Symbolic approach to the analysis of security protocols. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 10(9), 1156-1198. Disponible

Lafrance, S., & Mullins, J. (2003). An information flow method to detect denial of service vulnerabilities. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 9(11), 1350-1369. Disponible

Lafrance, S., & Mullins, J. (avril 2003). An information flow method to detect denial of service vulnerabilities [Communication écrite]. IEEE TC-ECBS and IFIP WG10.1 Joint Workshop on Formal Specifications of Computer-Based Systems, Huntsville, AL, US. Non disponible

Lafrance, S., & Mullins, J. (2002). Using admissible interference to detect denial of service attacks. (Rapport technique n° EPM-RT-2002-01). Disponible

Lafrance, S., & Mullins, J. (janvier 2002). Bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference and its application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols [Communication écrite]. Computing: the Australasian Theory Symposium (CATS 2002), Monash University, Melbourne, Australia (24 pages). Publié dans Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 61. Disponible

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Mullins, J., & Lafrance, S. (2003). Bisimulation-Based Non-Deterministic Admissible Interference and Its Application to the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols. Information and Software Technology, 45(11), 779-790. Lien externe

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