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On Proper Refinement of Bimatrix Games Extreme Nash Equilibria

Charles Audet, Slim Belhaiza and Pierre Hansen

Technical Report (2010)

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Department: Department of Mathematics and Industrial Engineering
Research Center: GERAD - Research Group in Decision Analysis
PolyPublie URL: https://publications.polymtl.ca/63839/
Report number: G-2010-15
Official URL: https://www.gerad.ca/fr/papers/G-2010-15
Date Deposited: 09 May 2025 17:02
Last Modified: 09 May 2025 17:02
Cite in APA 7: Audet, C., Belhaiza, S., & Hansen, P. (2010). On Proper Refinement of Bimatrix Games Extreme Nash Equilibria. (Technical Report n° G-2010-15). https://www.gerad.ca/fr/papers/G-2010-15

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