Charles Audet
, Slim Belhaiza and Pierre Hansen
Technical Report (2007)
An external link is available for this item| Department: | Department of Mathematics and Industrial Engineering |
|---|---|
| Research Center: | GERAD - Research Group in Decision Analysis |
| PolyPublie URL: | https://publications.polymtl.ca/63772/ |
| Report number: | G-2007-85 |
| Official URL: | https://www.gerad.ca/fr/papers/G-2007-85 |
| Date Deposited: | 14 May 2025 14:15 |
| Last Modified: | 14 May 2025 14:15 |
| Cite in APA 7: | Audet, C., Belhaiza, S., & Hansen, P. (2007). Perfect and Proper Refinements of All Extreme Nash Equilibria for Bimatrix Games. (Technical Report n° G-2007-85). https://www.gerad.ca/fr/papers/G-2007-85 |
|---|---|
Statistics
Stats are not available on this system.
Repository Staff Only
|
View Item |
