<  Back to the Polytechnique Montréal portal

A new sequence form approach for the enumeration of all extreme nash equilibria for extensive form games

Charles Audet, Slim Belhaiza and Pierre Hansen

Article (2009)

An external link is available for this item
Department: Department of Mathematics and Industrial Engineering
Research Center: GERAD - Research Group in Decision Analysis
PolyPublie URL: https://publications.polymtl.ca/20019/
Journal Title: International Game Theory Review (vol. 11, no. 4)
Publisher: World Scientific
DOI: 10.1142/s021919890900242x
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890900242x
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2023 15:14
Last Modified: 15 May 2025 16:19
Cite in APA 7: Audet, C., Belhaiza, S., & Hansen, P. (2009). A new sequence form approach for the enumeration of all extreme nash equilibria for extensive form games. International Game Theory Review, 11(4), 437-451. https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890900242x

Statistics

Dimensions

Repository Staff Only

View Item View Item