<  Back to the Polytechnique Montréal portal

On Proper Refinement of Nash Equilibria for Bimatrix Games

Slim Belhaiza, Charles Audet and Pierre Hansen

Article (2012)

An external link is available for this item
Department: Department of Mathematics and Industrial Engineering
Research Center: GERAD - Research Group in Decision Analysis
PolyPublie URL: https://publications.polymtl.ca/15802/
Journal Title: Automatica (vol. 48, no. 2)
Publisher: Elsevier
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2011.07.013
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2011.07.013
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2023 15:10
Last Modified: 09 May 2025 16:12
Cite in APA 7: Belhaiza, S., Audet, C., & Hansen, P. (2012). On Proper Refinement of Nash Equilibria for Bimatrix Games. Automatica, 48(2), 297-303. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2011.07.013

Statistics

Dimensions

Repository Staff Only

View Item View Item