Resilience estimation of cyber-physical systems via quantitative metrics

This paper is about the estimation of the cyber-resilience of CPS. We define two new resilience estimation metrics: k-steerability and l -monitorability. They aim at assisting designers to evaluate and increase the cyber-resilience of CPS when facing stealthy attacks. The k-steerability metric reflects the ability of a controller to act on individual plant state variables when, at least, k different groups of functionally diverse input signals may be processed. The l -monitorability metric indicates the ability of a controller to monitor individual plant state variables with l different groups of functionally diverse outputs. Paired together, the metrics lead to CPS reaching (k, l )-resilience. When k and l are both greater than one, a CPS can absorb and adapt to control-theoretic attacks manipulating input and output signals. We also relate the parameters k and l to the recoverability of a system. We define recoverability strategies to mitigate the impact of perpetrated attacks. We show that the values of k and l can be augmented by combining redundancy and diversity in hardware and software, in order to apply the moving target paradigm. We validate the approach via simulation and numeric results.

Uncontrolled Keywords

Cyber-physical systems ; control theory ; cyber-resilience ; covert attacks ; security metrics ; attack remediation ; recoverability ; resilience estimation