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A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback stackelberg differential game

Sophie Bernard

Paper (2009)

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Additional Information: En anglais : Montréal Natural Resources and Environmental Economics Workshop
Department: Department of Mathematics and Industrial Engineering
PolyPublie URL: https://publications.polymtl.ca/50141/
Conference Title: Atelier d'économie des ressources naturelles et de l'envionnement 2009
Conference Location: Montréal, Québec
Conference Date(s): 2009-02-13
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2023 15:14
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2024 11:53
Cite in APA 7: Bernard, S. (2009, February). A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback stackelberg differential game [Paper]. Atelier d'économie des ressources naturelles et de l'envionnement 2009, Montréal, Québec.

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